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Payments are increasingly being made with payment cards rather than currency￿ this
despite the fact that the operational cost of clearing a card payment usually exceeds
the cost of transferring cash. In this paper we examine this puzzle through the lens
of monetary theory. We consider the design of an optimal card-based payment system
when cash is available as an alternative means of payment, and derive conditions under
which cards will be preferred to cash. We ￿nd that a feature akin to the controversial
￿no-surcharge rule￿may be necessary to ensure the viability of the card payment system.
This rule, which is part of the contract between a card provider and a merchant, states
that the merchant cannot charge a customer who pays by card more than a customer
who pays by cash.
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Reserve Banks of New York and Philadelphia, as well as Bob Hunt, Nobu Kiyotaki, Antoine Martin,
Jamie McAndrews, Steve Williamson, and Randy Wright for comments and suggestions. The views ex-
pressed in the paper are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Atlanta, or the Federal Reserve System. This paper is available free of charge at
www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/wps/index.html
11 Introduction
Transactions that were once conducted only with cash￿ purchases of fast food meals, movies,
taxi rides, etc.￿ are increasingly made using credit cards, debit cards, and various other
payment methods that electronically link buyers to their payment histories. Evidently,
money is being displaced by memory.1
A commonly cited explanation for this phenomenon is the ongoing improvement in in-
formation technology. As the cost of storing, transmitting, and authenticating data falls,
so the thinking goes, payment systems based on electronic accounts become more attrac-
tive relative to cash. This explanation is in accordance with accepted monetary theory
(Kocherlakota 1998), which views cash as a second-best proxy for credit when the latter is
too costly or simply unavailable.
A practical di¢ culty with this argument, however, is that in many instances the cost
of making a cash transaction remains noticeably lower than any other type of payment.
The cost of simply handing over a banknote, after all, is still virtually zero, and the burden
imposed by in￿ ation has fallen drastically over the past two decades. Systematic studies,
taking into account the costs of safekeeping, trips to the bank, etc. place the merchant￿ s
cost of a typical cash transaction in the U.S. at about $.10. By contrast, the average
merchant cost of a debit card transaction is in the range of $.34, and the typical credit
card transaction costs a merchant in excess of $.70.2 A recent study by Garcia-Swartz,
Hahn, and Layne-Farrar (2006) attempts to measure the costs of various payment methods
to all parties involved. It argues that card payments are more competitive with cash once
buyers￿￿implicit cost￿of using cash￿ especially the ￿shoe-leather￿cost of visiting an ATM,
estimated at more than $.28 per transaction￿ is taken into account. As this last number is
necessarily somewhat imprecise (for example cash can circulate in ways that are not easily
observable by econometricians), we would still argue that cash remains the cheapest way to
1Aggregate statistics collected by the Bank for International Settlements (Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems 2006) show that the volume and value of card-based payments has sharply accelerated
over the past ten years in all developed countries. This trend is also apparent in U.S. household survey data
(Klee 2006) and recent Federal Reserve surveys (Gerdes at al. 2005). While these numbers do not track
cash payments, a 2005 survey conducted by Visa, cited in Garcia-Swartz, Hahn, and Layne-Farrar (2006)
indicates a signi￿cant dropo⁄ in the use of cash in the U.S. over the past decade.
2Figures are from an oft-cited 2001 Food Marketing Institute survey; see Humphrey et al. (2003).
2pay in many situations.
The higher cost of card payments is not readily apparent to purchasers because it is
borne by merchants in the form of a merchant fee (a.k.a. ￿merchant discount￿ ) paid by
a seller of goods or services to the card company. In the U.S. this fee averages about 2
percent of the purchase amount for credit cards.3 Usually this fee is not paid explicitly
by the buyer but is instead deducted from the merchant￿ s payment by the card provider,
and the buyer pays the same price as he would have using cash. Payment card providers
reinforce this practice with a contractual provision known as a no-surcharge rule (NSR,
a.k.a. ￿no-discrimination rule￿ ) that prohibits merchants from passing through this fee to
customers who wish to pay with their credit or debit card.4
The no-surcharge rule has been extremely controversial, and has been banned in some
countries (e.g., Australia; see Lowe 2005) as a form of collusive price-￿xing. Critics of NSR
have argued that it ine¢ ciently encourages the use of more costly forms of payment (cards)
over less costly cash, leading to what the governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia has
termed a ￿Gresham￿ s Law of Payments￿(Macfarlane 2005).5
Against the cost disadvantages must be set the bene￿ts of card payment: certainly in
the case of credit cards at least, paying by card allows buyers to tap into their credit lines
in a convenient and straightforward way. But this argument does not apply so easily in the
case of debit cards or credit cards that are paid o⁄ every month. ￿Paybacks￿to card use,
commonly given in the form of frequent ￿ yer miles, cash-back, or other rewards, further
increase buyers￿incentives to use cards while reducing the ￿social cost￿of card transactions.
Even so, paybacks cannot explain why a payments instrument with an apparently even lower
social cost, cash, is not preferred.
As a benchmark, the Coase Theorem would predict that the NSR is irrelevant, as long as
all parties to a transaction are able to contract around it. Papers in the industrial organiza-
tion literature, such as Rochet and Tirole (2002), contend that the Coase Theorem can fail
3Average merchant fees on credit card transactions in 2005 were 2.19 percent for MasterCard and Visa,
2.41 percent for American Express, and 1.76 percent for Discover (Nilson Report, Issue 862, 2006).
4Under U.S. law consumers are still entitled to negotiate discounts if they o⁄er cash. Such discounts are
rarely o⁄ered for routine purchases, however. In some other countries even this practice is prohibited.
5See Chakravorti and To (1999) for a formal discussion of this idea. Lowe (2005) notes that surcharging
for card use is still uncommon in Australia, despite the regulatory removal of NSR.
3in a payments environment, due to an asymmetry in market power between merchants and
consumers.6 A no-surcharge rule, it is argued, may actually improve welfare by preventing
monopolistic merchants from ine¢ ciently shifting the costs of a card payment system to
consumers.
Below we consider the issue of card pricing as an application of monetary theory. We
specify a dynamic environment that incorporates the standard frictions that give rise to
the use of payment systems: time mismatches of agents￿trading demands, private infor-
mation about agents￿preferences, and limited enforcement of their pledges to repay. As in
actual payment situations, the term ￿limited enforcement￿incorporates both the potential
anonymity of market participants, and, once these have been identi￿ed, a limited ability to
apply penalties when an agent defaults.
Next we introduce a transactions technology, which, at a cost, allows for relaxation
of these frictions. This technology, which we interpret as a card-based payment system,
must compete with an alternative payments technology in the form of cash. To make
cash as attractive as possible, we assume it is uncounterfeitable, not subject to theft, and
can be transferred for free. We then show how a planner would structure an optimal card
system when cash is available. Certain features of real-world card payment systems, such as
merchant fees and the no-surcharge rule, emerge endogenously as an advantageous features
of such a system.
The intuition behind the model￿ s version of the NSR is particularly simple. In our envi-
ronment, the use of a card payment system relaxes cash constraints on potential purchasers.
A no-surcharge rule promotes broad participation in the card payment system by, in e⁄ect,
taxing the use of cash. Participation in a card payment system has both a private bene￿t
(relaxing constraints on purchasers) and social bene￿t (sustaining the system that allows
for relaxation of these constraints), and a no-surcharge rule allows agents to fully internalize
the e⁄ects of their participation.
6For surveys of the extensive literature on the industrial organization of card payments, see Chakravorti
(2003), Hunt (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2004), Evans and Schmalensee (2005), and Rochet and Tirole
(2006).
42 The Environment
Modeling choices. The analysis obviously requires an environment where agents may pay
either with cash or with a card. To provide some minimal degree of verisimilitude, payment
cards in particular should incorporate both a ￿credit￿or record-keeping function (Kocher-
lakota 1998) and a ￿payment￿function￿ identi￿cation of otherwise anonymous transactors
(Kahn and Roberds, forthcoming). That is, the cards in the model should, just as with
actual payment cards, serve the dual purpose of recording agents￿transaction histories and
correlating transactors with histories.
Verisimilitude also requires that debt incurred through use of payment cards be subject
to some limitations on enforcement. Card debt is rarely collateralized and by its nature
somewhat risky. While most credit card transactions are eventually paid o⁄ (default rates
average about 4 percent in the U.S.), very little of the defaulted debt is ever collected.7
The need to incorporate limited enforcement sets our analysis o⁄ from standard cash-
good/credit-good approaches in the macro literature, e.g., Lacker and Schreft (1996), where
this friction does not arise.
The Lagos-Wright (2005) model is an attractive starting point for our study of the
NSR, since it provides a tractable model of anonymous exchange where agents can hold
arbitrary money balances. Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007) have shown how the
Lagos-Wright environment can be modi￿ed to incorporate uncollateralized credit, and our
analysis will follow their setup in many respects. Our approach is also quite similar to
that of Telyukova and Wright (forthcoming), who study the credit card debt puzzle, i.e.,
why people simultaneously carry cash balances and credit card debt. We simplify and
enrich their model slightly as we are interested in a di⁄erent question, namely the pricing
of card-based payment services.
Finally, to keep track of surcharges it is important that someone will always use cash.
To this end our setup includes a group of agents who, by assumption, are excluded from
making use of alternative payment arrangements.
Agents, preferences, and technology. Time t = 0;1;:::, is in￿nite and discrete. The
economy consists of a [0;1] continuum of agents. Agents are in￿nitely lived and discount the
7For example, in 2005, MasterCard and Visa were only able to collect about 9 percent of defaulted credit
card balances (Nilson Report, Issue 851, 2006).
5future at rate ￿. A proportion ￿ of agents can be identi￿ed at a utility cost ￿, in the sense
that associated with each of these agents is a unique veri￿able quantity that we will call his
￿identity.￿ 8 For a proportion (1 ￿ ￿) of the population, this veri￿cation cost is e⁄ectively
in￿nite.
Agents produce and consume two types of nonstorable goods: a specialized good and a
numeraire good.9 Utility (disutility) of consumption (production) of the numeraire good is
linear. Consumption of the numeraire good is denoted as the negative of ￿hours worked￿h.
There is a linear cost ￿qs of producing qs units of the specialized good. All agents enjoy
utility u(q) when they consume q units of the specialized good, where u0(q) > 0; u00(q) < 0,
u0(0) = 1 and limq!1 u0(q) = 0.
Trading stages. Each period has two subperiods, each with its own market. Markets
in both subperiods are Walrasian in the sense that no agent has market power.10 The nature
of trading is quite di⁄erent in the two subperiods, however.
In the ￿rst subperiod, the numeraire good is exchanged and a trader￿ s identity can be
veri￿ed by other agents at zero cost, should the agent decide to make his identity available.
We call this stage the settlement stage.
In the second subperiod, the trading stage, the specialized good is exchanged in ￿incom-
plete anonymity.￿This means that in this stage, agents are unrecognizable to one another,
absent the application of some costly identifying technology (discussed in detail below).
Application of this technology allows an agent￿ s identity to be determined with perfect ac-
curacy; however, agents again always decide whether they want to be identi￿ed and may
remain anonymous if they so prefer.
Within the trading stage, a randomly selected proportion a 2 (0;1) of the population
has the opportunity to actively engage in trade. Of these, a randomly selected proportion
8Alternatively, an agent￿ s identity could be thought of as his ￿location,￿ although our model does not
rely on geographical dispersion.
9Models in the payment cards literature customarily divide agents ex-ante into producers (merchants)
and consumers. Our approach here follows the tradition of the money literature in which each agent￿ s role in
decentralized markets is randomly determined and private information to the agent. We would still obtain
the no-surcharge rule if agents were divided ex ante into producers and consumers.
10Our environment could be modi￿ed to allow for other pricing mechanisms at the transaction stage, such
as price posting or bargaining (see Rocheteau and Wright 2005). Here we focus on Walrasian markets so as
to abstract from issues considered in the industrial organization literature.
61 ￿ n have the desire to consume specialized goods produced by others; otherwise they
become potential producers with probability n 2 (0;1). The remaining proportion 1 ￿ a of
the population are inactive, meaning that during this stage they have neither the desire to
consume nor the opportunity to produce. A consumer￿ s trading-stage state (buyer, seller,
inactive) is private information. The timing of events within a period is summarized in the
following table.
1. Settlement stage
Agents produce, trade, and consume numeraire good
2. Trading stage
2a. Agents learn if they are consumers, producers, or inactive
2b. Buyers (consumers) and sellers (producers) trade specialized goods
2c. Buyers consume specialized goods
Table 1: Events within a period
Allocations. In this economy, we will consider symmetric stationary feasible alloca-
tions. A stationary allocation is a vector (q;qs;hs;hb;hi). The triple (hs;hb;hi) denotes
hours worked for an agent of type j when he was a seller (s), buyer (b), or inactive (i) in
the previous trading stage. An allocation is feasible if
(1 ￿ n)q ￿ nqs = 0; (1)
a(nhs + (1 ￿ n)hb) + (1 ￿ a)hi = 0: (2)
where (1) is the market clearing condition for the specialized good in the trading stage and
(2) is the market clearing condition for the numeraire good during the settlement stage.
2.1 First best allocation
We begin by considering optimal allocations in the absence of information and enforcement
constraints. The expected utility of an agent at the start of a trading stage is
W = af(1 ￿ n)[u(q) ￿ hb] ￿ n(qs ￿ hs)g ￿ (1 ￿ a)hi:
7We take the planner￿ s objective function to be the maximization of the agents￿lifetime
payo⁄ W :
(1 ￿ ￿)W = W:
Using the market clearing conditions, this reduces to
(1 ￿ ￿)W = a[u(q) ￿ q]:
Therefore a ￿rst best allocation is one that satis￿es q = q￿ where
u0(q￿) = 1:
3 The Cash Economy
As agents are not automatically identi￿able during the trading stage, they need some type
of recordkeeping in order to transact. In this section we consider the economy where only
cash ￿the simplest form of recordkeeping ￿is available. Cash is uncounterfeitable and can
be costlessly authenticated and transferred among agents. Agents may trade numeraire for
cash during the settlement stage; cash so acquired can then be used for purchases during
the trading stage.
Let Mt be the per capita supply of cash in period t. Cash grows at the exogenously
given and time independent rate ￿, so that Mt+1 = ￿Mt. In the analysis, we drop the index
t when there is no chance of confusion, so that Mt becomes M and Mt+1 becomes M+1.
We will concentrate the analysis on stationary monetary equilibria where ￿+1M+1 = ￿M,
￿ being the real price of money in terms of numeraire. We will denote the growth rate of
money M+1=M by ￿. Hence ￿ also equals ￿=￿+1.
Let V (m) denote the discounted lifetime utility of an adult when he enters the settlement
stage holding m units of cash, while W(m) denotes the expected discounted lifetime utility
from entering the trading stage with money holding m. V (m) is de￿ned as
V (m) = max
h;m+1
￿h + ￿W(m+1)
s:t: ￿m+1 = h + ￿m + ￿￿:
where ￿ is a nominal transfer received by all agents. The ￿rst-order and envelope conditions
give
￿W0(m+1) = ￿; V 0(m) = ￿: (3)
8It follows that m+1 is independent of the past trading history of agent which is summarized
in m, and all adults exit the settlement stage with the same holdings of cash.
Agents￿discounted lifetime utility when they enter the trading stage with m units of
cash is
W(m) = af(1 ￿ n)[u(q) + V (m ￿ pq)] + n[￿qs + V (m + pqs)]g + (1 ￿ a)V (m);
where q and qs are set optimally as follows. A producer at the trading stage solves
max
qs
￿qs + V (m + pqs);
with ￿rst-order condition
pV 0(m + pqs) = 1:
Therefore using (3) we have
p￿ = 1: (4)
A consumer solves
max
q u(q) + V (m ￿ pq)
s:t: pq ￿ m:
and the ￿rst-order condition gives
u0(q) ￿ ￿p = ￿p;
where V 0(m ￿ pq) has been replaced by ￿ using (3). That is to say, either ￿ > 0 in which
case the consumer￿ s budget constraint binds so that q = m=p and u0(q) > ￿p, or the budget
constraint does not bind, ￿ = 0 and q solves u0(q) = p￿.
It is now easy to determine the value of an additional unit of money when agents exit
the settlement stage. Using the solution to the buyer￿ s problem, this is
W0(m) = a(1 ￿ n)[(u0(q) ￿ 1)
1
p
+ ￿] + [an + (1 ￿ a)]￿:
However, we know that p￿ = 1 and W0(m) = ￿￿1=￿. Hence we obtain another equilibrium
condition, which characterizes the quantity consumed in the trading stage as a function of
the money growth rate ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
= a(1 ￿ n)[u0(q) ￿ 1]: (5)
We can now de￿ne and characterize a stationary monetary equilibrium.
9De￿nition 1 Given ￿, a stationary monetary equilibrium is q such that (5) holds.
Proposition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium exists for all ￿ ￿ ￿, and is unique for
all ￿ > ￿. The equilibrium consumption of the specialized good q is strictly decreasing in ￿.
The proof of the proposition follows immediately from condition (5). Note that if the
Friedman rule holds, i.e., if ￿ = ￿; consumers always hold enough money to purchase the
e¢ cient amount, so that in equilibrium u0(q) = 1.
4 The Cash-Card Economy
The requirement to transact in cash constrains agents when monetary policy does not
follow the Friedman rule. Away from the Friedman rule, the availability of other payment
arrangements can potentially improve welfare by relaxing agents￿cash constraints. In this
section, we consider how one such arrangement a⁄ects welfare. This part of the paper draws
on the private information approach developed in Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (KMT,
forthcoming and 2007).
Note that the anonymity prevalent during the trading periods means that agents cannot
increase their consumption by simply issuing bonds: absent some means of identifying the
bond issuer, such a bond would be worthless. Consequently, a payment arrangement must
also incorporate some technology for identifying debtors. To ￿x ideas, we imagine that this
identi￿cation occurs using plastic cards.
More speci￿cally, we may imagine that the planner relies on a club arrangement known
as a card club (CC).11 Each of the ￿ agents whose identity is veri￿able may choose to
participate in the club. The CC incurs monitoring costs ￿ ￿ 0 per club member, per period,
in verifying the identity of its members.12 This cost is denominated in the numeraire good
11A club arrangement is quite natural since veri￿cation of an agent￿ s identity will amount to provision of
a nonrival good. Reliance on the club implicitly assumes that the planner is solving a constrained Pareto
problem of maximizing the welfare of those within the club.
12As in Kahn and Roberds (forthcoming), each new member, upon veri￿cation of his identity, receives a
unique, uncounterfeitable card that may be subsequently veri￿ed at zero cost. Following their setup, we will
exclude the possibility of fraud on the supplier (￿merchant￿ ) side. This means that in every trading period,
once a CC member identi￿es himself as a supplier, his delivery (or nondelivery) of specialized goods within
that period becomes observable.
10and is incurred at the end of the settlement stage.13 Once it has incurred this cost, the
CC can verify agents as members and record a member￿ s transactions during the trading
stage. However it cannot observe whether an agent￿ s state is ￿active￿or ￿inactive￿at the
trading stage, or whether an agent trades with cash in the trading stage. Nor can the CC
force continued participation in the club. Recall that the identity of the remainder (1 ￿ ￿)
of the population is unveri￿able, which prevents these agents from joining the CC.
The CC will seek to implement the ￿rst best allocation q￿ in the trading stage for the
members of the CC. Hence, CC does not seek to maximize pro￿t but only to achieve q￿ and
to recover costs. Following KMT, we will design the terms of the card club so that agents
truthfully reveal their state (consumer, producer, inactive) and so that they are willing to
participate in the card arrangement given the outside option of using cash. The CC has no
control over monetary policy and takes the money growth rate ￿ as given.
As in KMT, the CC assigns balances to participants.14 The club speci￿es rules for how
the balances are updated given the histories of reports regarding transactions in the trading
round. During the settlement stage, participants can trade balances for the numeraire good.
Here the settlement stage is modelled as a competitive market in which agents who are
￿low￿can increase their balances by producing numeraire, while those with high balances
end up as consumers of numeraire. During the settlement stage, balances are exchanged for
numeraire at price ￿b. We let d denote the amount of balances with which agents exit the
settlement stage.
Qualitatively, there are three possibilities regarding agents￿trading-stage activity: an
agent can be a consumer, a producer, or inactive. The vector of policy rules (Lt;Kt;Bt;q￿)
then determines the respective balance adjustments for each type of agent and the quantity
consumed by each consumer, q￿. More precisely, Lt(Kt) is the adjustment for an agent who
consumes (produces), while Bt is the adjustment for an inactive agent. These functions in
general may depend on the agents￿histories of transactions, as summarized by their current
13At the cost of additional complexity, we could incorporate per-transaction costs of using the card system,
as is customary in many models of card payments beginning with Baxter (1983). Here we abstract from
these costs in order to focus on the key services provided by modern card payment systems￿ authentication
and recordkeeping￿ whose marginal costs are close to zero under modern technology.
14These balances are precisely de￿ned in KMT; for our purposes we will think of them as running totals
of an agent￿ s transactions.
11balances, as well as on the distribution of balances when agents exit the settlement stage.
Balances are represented by real numbers not restricted in sign, while production of goods
in the trading stage is restricted to be positive. After each trading stage, agents enter the
settlement round knowing their new balances.
We should note that the CC cannot impose any direct penalty on a member with low
balances who does not readjust his balance during a settlement period. That is, a CC
member can walk away from the arrangement at any time. The only penalty the CC can
apply is denial of future access.
We de￿ne a card system (CS) to be an array of functions fLt;Kt;Bt;q￿g. A CS is
feasible if it satis￿es certain incentive and participation constraints (speci￿ed below). A
CS is simple if balance adjustments do not depend on the agents￿current balances and
are therefore history independent. A feasible CS is optimal if it implements the e¢ cient
trading-period allocation q￿. Note that a CS requires the existence of a CC in order to
identify agents.
Assumption 1 The ￿rst best allocation satis￿es ￿u(q￿) > q￿.
Under assumption 1, KMT show that there exists a simple optimal CS, where balances
upon exiting the settlement stage dt are equal to zero for all t. In other words, if a member
of the CC exits the settlement stage with d 6= 0, then the CC shuts down the account of
this member so that his card becomes invalid. It follows that the equilibrium distribution
of balances is degenerate at d = 0, when CC members exit the settlement stage.
As in the cash economy, the trading stage is still a Walrasian market. The auctioneer
has a list transmitted by the CC of those eligible to use their cards. The auctioneer then
calls a price pand quantities (qm;qs;m) consumed and produced when cash is used, as well
as the terms of the CS. Then CC members decide if they will participate, and if so, whether
they will use cash or cards. That is, they may participate anonymously as cash agents, or
they may allow themselves to be identi￿ed, and transact using cards. CC members thus
have the opportunity to use cash rather than cards at any time. Unveri￿able agents remain
outside the CC, and will always use cash. Hence, while an active cash market will always
exist, a successful CS should contain incentives such that CC members transact using cards.
In such a system, prices and quantities have to clear the market. We assume that the
12auctioneer does not cross-subsidize consumption across those agents that use cash and those
that use cards.15 More precisely, the auctioneer faces two market clearing conditions. Given
that active agents are sellers with probability n and buyers with probability 1 ￿ n, these
market clearing conditions are
(1 ￿ n)q￿ = nq￿
s;
(1 ￿ n)qm = nqs;m:
We also exclude the possibility of cross-subsidization through the central bank: only agents
holding currency in the settlement period are eligible to receive lump-sum transfers from
the central bank. This might occur, for example, if currency becomes worn after a single
period, so that cash holders must submit old banknotes in order to obtain new ones.
In the previous section, we have studied the problem of agents who may only transact
with cash. We now describe the problem of agents with access to both cash and the CC.
4.1 Cards at the settlement stage
Let Z(b;m) denote the value function of a CC member who exits the trading round with
balance b and cash holdings m. Let H(d;m+1) denote the value of an agent who exits the
settlement round with balance d = 0 and cash holdings m+1. If the price of balances in




f￿h + ￿H(b+1;m+1)g (6)
s.t. ￿m+1 + ￿bb+1 = h + ￿bb + ￿m:
The ￿rst order condition with respect to money gives
￿Hm (0;m+1) ￿ ￿ with strict inequality if m+1 = 0. (7)
The envelope conditions are Zb = ￿b and Zm = ￿. Since the CC requires card users to
carry zero balances when they exit the settlement stage, under the threat of exclusion, we
15Some policy discussions of NSR have focused on the issue of potential cross-subsidization between
purchasers using cash and those using cards. We abstract from this issue in order to focus on allocations
across heterogeneous participants in the card arrangement.
13have b+1 = 0. When CC members do not carry cash m+1 = 0 and it follows that
h = ￿￿bb:
Note that the linearity in preferences implies that the value function Z (b;m) is linear in
card balances and cash holdings.
Also, for any balance b, it should be the case that CC members are better o⁄ (at the
settlement stage) staying in the system than choosing to use cash forever after. This no-
default constraint imposes that for any b,
Z (b;m) ￿ ￿(m ￿ m+1) + ￿W (m+1):
In the Appendix, we show that this requirement reduces to
￿bL ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿qm +
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿
[u(qm) ￿ u(q￿) ￿ (qm ￿ q￿)] (8)
The cost-recovery constraint in the settlement stage requires that members cover the
operational costs incurred by the CC
a￿b [nK + (1 ￿ n)L] + (1 ￿ a)￿bB + ￿ = 0: (9)
4.2 Cards at the trading stage
We now turn to the problem faced by CC members during the trading round. Agents
make reports to the auctioneer about their state (consumer, producer, inactive). Those
that report ￿producer￿receive instructions from the auctioneer to produce q￿
s. Consumers
receive q￿. The auctioneer subsequently communicates the identity and reports of those
CC members that made use of the CS to the CC, which then makes balance adjustments
depending on these reports.
For agents to report their state truthfully, some conditions have to be satis￿ed. In
particular, incentive constraints require that the following inequalities hold:
u(q￿) + Z(L;m) ￿ Z(B;m);
￿q￿
s + Z(K;m) ￿ Z(B;m);
Z (B;m) ￿ Z (L;m):
14The ￿rst (second) constraint states that a consumer (producer) must be at least as well
o⁄ declaring his true state as reporting he is inactive. The third constraint states that an
inactive agent does not ￿nd it pro￿table to claim that he is a consumer. Since the value
function Z is linear, these conditions simplify to
u(q￿) + ￿bL ￿ ￿bB; (10)
￿q￿
s + ￿bK ￿ ￿bB; (11)
B ￿ L: (12)
In addition, participation constraints require that producers, consumers, and inactive CC
members respectively, are better o⁄ using cards than cash; i.e.,
￿q￿
s + Z(K;m) ￿ ￿qs;m + maxfZ(B;m + pqs;m);V (m + pqs;m)g;
u(q￿) + Z(L;m) ￿ u(qm) + maxfZ (B;m ￿ pqm);V (m ￿ pqm)g;
Z(B;m) ￿ maxfZ(B;m);V (m)g:
where m can be zero. The ￿rst constraint states that a seller is better o⁄ producing the
e¢ cient amount and incurring balance adjustment K than reporting inactivity, incurring
adjustment B (if he stays in the card club) and selling his good for cash instead. The second
constraint states that a consumer is better o⁄ consuming the e¢ cient quantity using a card
than reporting inactivity (or opting out of the card arrangement) and using cash. The third
condition, the participation constraint for the inactive agents, is just a special case of the
no-default condition (8) and drops out. Note that condition (8) implies that if they use
cash, active card agents will prefer to stay in the club. Exploiting the linearity of the value
function Z, the nonredundant participation constraints can be rewritten as
￿q￿
s + ￿b (K ￿ B) ￿ ￿qs;m + ￿pqs;m
u(q￿) + ￿b (L ￿ B) ￿ u(qm) ￿ ￿pqm:
Simplifying these expressions using p￿ = 1, these reduce to
￿q￿
s + ￿b (K ￿ B) ￿ 0 (13)
u(q￿) + ￿b (L ￿ B) ￿ u(qm) ￿ qm: (14)
Now, if (13) and (14) hold then (11) and (10) hold as well.
15As before we con￿ne our attention to stationary equilibria and require that ￿+1M+1 =
￿M. We also require that ￿bX = ￿b;+1X+1, where X denotes any balance adjustments. In
the following we will normalize ￿b = 1 and consider constant balance adjustments. We are
now in a position to de￿ne a cash-card equilibrium and state the main results of the paper
(proofs are in the Appendix).
De￿nition 2 Given ￿, a stationary cash-card equilibrium is a card system (L;K;B;q￿)
and a (cash) trading-stage consumption q satisfying (5), (8), (9), (12), (13), and (14).
In words, a cash-card equilibrium must satisfy the conditions for a stationary monetary
equilibrium, as well as the no-default, cost-recovery, incentive, and participation constraints
necessary to sustain the CC. In such an equilibrium, only the 1 ￿ ￿ unveri￿able agents
transact with cash. All other transactions occur through the CC.
Proposition 2 A stationary cash-card equilibrium exists if 0 < ￿ < ￿ and ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿) ￿ ￿,
where ￿0 (￿) > 0.
Therefore, there is an equilibrium where cards coexist with cash as long as the monitoring
cost is low enough. Indeed, if the cost of monitoring agents were too large, then the ￿nancing
of the card arrangement would violate the participation constraint in the card arrangement,
independently of the value of cash. However, when the participation constraint is satis￿ed
for low monitoring costs, the value of cash then matters by a⁄ecting the no-default constraint
(8). The intuition is as follows. As the monitoring cost increases, participants in the
card arrangement have to contribute more to the card arrangement in each period. Their
incentive to use cash then increases. The card arrangement will then only exist for relatively
high values of ￿, i.e., high implicit costs of holding cash. As ￿ increases, then from (5) the
value of cash decreases and the level of consumption obtainable with cash decreases, making
the card arrangement more attractive.
We next consider the issue of welfare.
Proposition 3 Cards increase welfare if ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ (￿) > ￿, where ~ ￿0 (￿) > 0.
Not suprisingly, Proposition 3 shows that cards are welfare improving if cash is expen-
sive, i.e., when the in￿ ation tax is relatively high compared with the cost of using cards.
16Some care is called for in applying this result, however. Under Proposition 2, a cash-card
equilibrium can in some cases continue to exist (in steady state) even if the Friedman rule
is implemented, and despite the risk of default.16 Such an equilibrium would run counter to
the rationale for the card club, however, since it would deliver the same allocation as cash
but at a higher cost.
It is perhaps counterintuitive that a cash-card equilibrium can exist in cases where it
results in lower welfare than the cash equilibrium. To see how this can happen, let us
make the following thought experiment. Suppose a CC member defects from the club
and reverts to using cash. Then this agent has to incur the cost of acquiring cash before
returning to the cash economy. At the Friedman rule, it costs ￿q￿ = ￿q￿ to acquire the
cash necessary to buy q￿. The discounted lifetime payo⁄ for the defector is then ￿￿q￿ +
[u(q￿) ￿ q￿]=(1 ￿ ￿). If this agent were to use a card instead, he would enjoy a lifetime
payo⁄ of [u(q￿) ￿ q￿ ￿ ￿]=(1 ￿ ￿). Hence, this agent should keep using his card, even at
the Friedman rule, so long as ￿ < ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)q￿. In other words, switching to using cash
is costly, as one needs to accumulate a big enough cash balance to consume. Therefore,
although the steady-state payo⁄ of using cash is higher than that of using cards, agents
prefer to use cards as they do not need to accumulate the necessary cash balance.
A version of this same logic will be useful in our consideration of the no-surcharge rule,
to which we now turn.
4.3 The no-surcharge rule
A version of NSR arises quite naturally from the cash-card equilibrium described above. We
say that a cash-card equilibrium follows a no-surcharge rule when a consumer￿ s per-unit
cost of purchasing a specialized good through the card club does not exceed his cost of
making the same purchase using cash.17 Expressing consumers￿cost of a card purchase of





16Precise conditions are given in the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix.
17By stating this rule as an inequality we allow for the possibility of paybacks for card use.
17Recalling that in equilibrium p￿ = 1 and rearranging, this reduces to
￿q￿ ￿ L: (15)
In the Appendix we show that if the Friedman rule is in e⁄ect so that ￿ = ￿ and qm = q￿,
and there is a cash-card equilibrium, then the no-default condition (8) takes on a simple
form
￿ ￿ ￿q￿ ￿ L: (16)
In words, condition (16) states that the sum of the consumer￿ s balance adjustment ￿L and
the monitoring cost ￿ cannot exceed the cost of acquiring the necessary cash to defect from
the card arrangement, which is ￿q￿ at the Friedman rule. Condition (16) clearly implies
that the no-surcharge rule (15) must hold at the Friedman rule. And, since ￿q￿ < ￿￿￿q￿,
then by continuity, no-surcharge must also hold for rates of money growth slightly larger
than ￿. We state this as
Corollary 4 In the cash-card equilibrium, the no-surcharge rule (15) must hold for ￿ suf-
￿ciently close to ￿:
Hence, for monetary policies su¢ ciently close to the Friedman rule, NSR is an integral
feature of the card arrangement. At higher money growth rates, however, no-surcharge may
not hold. In other words, no-surcharge is needed exactly when the implicit cost of using
money is low, and some enticement is necessary to induce agents to transact using cards.
The cash-card equilibrium may also require that producers of specialized goods, in
e⁄ect, pay a form of merchant fee when they receive card payments, i.e., they receive less
compensation per unit sold, in numeraire terms, than producers who sell for cash. Analogous
to no-surcharge condition (15), we can say that a merchant fee is charged when a producer
obtains less through a card sale (and so obtaining balance K) than he would have by selling




To see that a merchant fee can be charged in equilibrium, note that cost-recovery con-
dition (9), combined with incentive constraint (12), places an upper bound on the compen-








18When the Friedman rule is in e⁄ect, we can then use (16), i.e., ￿q￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿L, to get the








































which can clearly occur for a close to 1, or ￿ large enough. By continuity, the same conditions
carry over to money growth rates su¢ ciently close to the Friedman rule.
These calculations demonstrate that a cash-card equilibrium in the model can mimic
the seemingly paradoxical real-world preference for card payments over cash. For the cases
considered, consumers who have a low-cost alternative to the card club (i.e., cash) still have
an incentive to pay with a card, since the price of paying by card is no more than paying
by cash. Producers agree to receive card payments, even though they receive less per unit
sold (in numeraire terms) than they would if they sold for cash.
The key to this somewhat magical arrangement is the possibility that an agent may be in
an inactive state during the trading stage, combined with the agent￿ s private knowledge of
his state. The possibility of inactivity is meaningful because it implies that nonparticipation
in the trading-stage market does not necessarily coincide with defection from the card
arrangement. Agents can be induced to truthfully reveal themselves as consumers, however,
by in e⁄ect ￿charging a fee￿to inactive agents, thereby keeping consumers￿price of card
purchases low. This in turn discourages consumers from defaulting and going over to cash.
Inactive agents and producers in our model continue to participate because they realize
that at some point they will bene￿t as consumers.
The critical role of the inactive state can be illustrated if we again consider the limiting
case of the Friedman rule, and simultaneously set a = 1, so that agents are always active
19during the trading stage. In this case we must set the inactive agents￿balance B = 0 in
conditions (10)-(14). Under the Friedman rule, the producers￿participation constraint (13)
reduces to




which is inconsistent with the no-default condition (16). Not coincidentally, (22) also vi-
olates the no-surcharge rule (15); agents would have no incentive to keep making card
purchases, and the card club collapses.
To summarize, in our model NSR is sometimes necessary to ensure the viability of the
club arrangement. At low in￿ ation rates, without the no-surcharge rule the card equilibrium
would collapse and only cash would be used. No-surcharge would not matter without limited
enforcement: if agents could be compelled to transact through the CC, the no-default
constraint (8) would drop out and the planner would have more ￿ exibility about how to
allocate the costs of card-based payment.
5 Discussion
The approach outlined above follows the papers in the money literature that model payment
arrangements as clubs, where membership in a club implies mutual knowledge of club
members￿identities and histories (or a su¢ cient subset thereof).18 As in many of these
papers, our model also allows club members the option of transacting anonymously with
cash, which serves to tighten members￿participation constraints. In such models, if money
is divisible then alternative payment arrangements become di¢ cult to sustain as monetary
policy approaches the Friedman rule. For the environment considered above, the no-default
constraint (8) is crucial to the sustainability of the card club, and at low in￿ ation rates this
constraint approximates the no-surcharge rule.
When monetary policy follows the Friedman rule exactly, the model can sustain a sort
of ￿Gresham￿ s Law￿equilibrium envisioned by Macfarlane (2005)￿ once a card arrangement
is in place, agents will continue to use it even though, over the long run, they would be
18Including Aiyagari and Williamson (2000), Corbae and Ritter (2004), Kahn and Roberds (forthcoming),
and Martin, Orlando, and Skeie (forthcoming). In Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007) this information
is managed by specialized intermediaries (banks).
20better o⁄ abandoning it in favor of cash. We do not regard this limiting result as evidence
against the desirability of the no-surcharge rule. To the contrary, in the more applicable case
where monetary policy does not follow the Friedman rule, our analysis shows that a policy
of no surcharges on card purchases emerges as a natural feature of a welfare-enhancing
arrangement. Thus, the mere existence of NSR in actual pricing schemes does not present
prima facie evidence of suboptimal pricing.
Paralleling other papers in this literature, ￿network e⁄ects￿arise quite naturally in our
model, since membership in (and repeated use of) the card arrangement amounts to a kind
of club good. We show how a no-surcharge rule can be instrumental in supporting the card
arrangement, by allowing agents to internalize the gains of club participation. This result
will hardly surprise people familiar with the literature on the industrial organization of the
payment card industry, where network e⁄ects have been a dominant theme of discussion
(e.g., Rochet and Tirole 2006). As noted in the introduction, however, our emphasis here
is not on industrial organization, but on understanding card-based payments in the context
of monetary theory.
6 Conclusion
Above we have presented an environment where some type of payment system is needed for
exchange. Away from the Friedman rule, ￿at money does not attain the ￿rst best allocation.
A card-based payment system can improve on allocations attainable by trading only with
cash. For monetary policies that are close to the Friedman rule, a no-surcharge rule may
be necessary to ensure the viability of the card-based system.
In the environment studied, no-surcharge is only valuable when there is both limited
enforcement of debts and private information about cardholder￿ s ability to supply a good,
i.e., ￿repay.￿But since these frictions are pervasive in real-world payment situations, this
restriction may be seen as more a desirable feature of the model than a limitation.
More generally we have attempted to illustrate how the tools of monetary theory can
be applied to the analysis of payment systems. Although our model is quite stylized, it also
highlights the key services provided by these systems ￿ identi￿cation (authentication) and
recordkeeping ￿ in a fully dynamic, general-equilibrium environment. This approach may
21prove useful in exploring the nature of the bene￿ts such systems provide, as well as the
many policy issues associated with their operation.
227 Appendix: proofs
7.1 Derivation of the no-default condition
By de￿nition, agents with balance b 2 fK;L;Bg do not default whenever
Z (b;m) ￿ ￿(m ￿ m+1) + ￿W (m+1):
The inactive agents￿incentive constraint (12) imposes B ￿ L. Also, from the incentive
constraint for sellers (11), we have K > B. Hence, consumers receive the minimum balance
adjustment from participation in the CCS. It is therefore enough to consider the no-default
condition for consumers, or
Z (L;m) ￿ ￿(m ￿ m+1) + ￿W (m+1): (23)
From the linearity of Z in m we have
￿m + Z (L;0) ￿ ￿(m ￿ m+1) + ￿W (m+1);
so that the no-default constraint (23) becomes
Z (L;0) ￿ ￿￿m+1 + ￿W (m+1)
Again using linearity of Z, this is
￿bL + ￿H (0;0) ￿ ￿￿m+1 + ￿W (m+1)
From the budget constraint of cash buyers in the trading stage we have m+1 = p+1qm.
Also, from (4) we have ￿+1p+1 = 1. Therefore ￿m+1 =
￿
￿+1￿+1p+1qm = ￿qm. So condition
(23) becomes
￿bL + ￿H (0;0) ￿ ￿￿qm + ￿W (m+1)




fa(1 ￿ n)[u(q￿) ￿ q￿] + a￿b [nK + (1 ￿ n)L] + (1 ￿ a)￿bBg ￿




fa(1 ￿ n)[u(q￿) ￿ q￿] ￿ ￿g ￿ ￿￿qm + ￿W (m+1)
23where the last inequality follows from (9). Therefore we may restate (23) as
￿bL ￿ ￿ +
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿





To derive the second inequality, we used the fact that the expected hours worked on the
settlement stage for a cash agent are by market clearing a[(1 ￿ n)hb + nhs]+(1 ￿ a)hi = 0.
Rearranging terms, the no-default condition is then given by
￿bL ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿qm +
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿
[u(qm) ￿ u(q￿) ￿ (qm ￿ q￿)]
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2













q￿ + K ￿ B ￿ 0
u(q￿) + L ￿ B ￿ u(qm) ￿ qm
L ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿qm +
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿
[u(qm) ￿ u(q￿) ￿ (qm ￿ q￿)]
a[nK + (1 ￿ n)L] + (1 ￿ a)B = ￿￿
From these constraints it follows that setting B = L slackens all the other constraints, thus
increasing the set of parameters for which a cash-card equilibrium exists. Hence we set




q￿ + K ￿ L (24)
u(q￿) ￿ u(qm) ￿ qm (25)
L ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿qm +
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿
[u(qm) ￿ u(q￿) ￿ (qm ￿ q￿)] (26)
a[nK + (1 ￿ n)L] + (1 ￿ a)L = ￿￿ (27)
24Condition (25) is always satis￿ed and is therefore redundant. From the cost-recovery con-
dition we get an expression for K as a function of L.
K = ￿
(1 ￿ an)L + ￿
an
(28)












(1 ￿ an)L + ￿
an
￿ L
L ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿qm +
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿
[u(qm) ￿ u(q￿) ￿ (qm ￿ q￿)]
Arranging terms we get
￿a(1 ￿ n)q￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ L
L ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿qm +
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿
[u(qm) ￿ u(q￿) ￿ (qm ￿ q￿)]
Therefore an equilibrium exists if
￿a(1 ￿ n)q￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ L ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿qm +
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿
[u(qm) ￿ u(q￿) ￿ (qm ￿ q￿)]
or if
￿a(1 ￿ n)q￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿￿qm +
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿
[u(qm) ￿ u(q￿) ￿ (qm ￿ q￿)]
which is equivalent to
a(1 ￿ n)q￿ + 2￿ ￿
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿
[u(q￿) ￿ q￿] ￿ ￿qm ￿
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿
[u(qm) ￿ qm]: (29)









u0 (qm) ￿ 1
￿ dqm
d￿
where using the equilibrium condition on the money market
￿ ￿ ￿
￿














































































which is guaranteed if ￿ is higher than 1=2. Therefore under this condition the RHS of (29)
is increasing in ￿. Now, at ￿ = ￿, we have qm = q￿ so that (29) becomes
a(1 ￿ n)q￿ + 2￿ ￿ ￿q￿
It is clear that this condition is satis￿ed for feasible parameters. For instance, if ￿ is
su¢ ciently small and a(1 ￿ n) < ￿. If this condition holds for some ￿, then (29) holds for
all ￿ > ￿. However if the above condition does not hold, then ￿ must be increased. Then
either there is a ￿ ￿(￿) high enough so that (29) holds with equality (and therefore holds with
strict inequality for all ￿ > ￿ ￿(￿)), or (29) never holds (this is the case if for instance ￿ is
large and the RHS of (29) reaches an asymptote as ￿ ! 1, which depends on the third
derivative of the utility function). Therefore, there is a ￿0 > 0 such that for all ￿ < ￿0, (29)
holds if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿). Furthermore ￿0 (￿) > 0.
Finally, a cash-card equilibrium will not exist if the expected payo⁄ from participating
in the card scheme is negative, that is if
a(1 ￿ n)[u(q￿) ￿ q￿] ￿ ￿ ￿ 0;
26or if
b ￿ = a(1 ￿ n)[u(q￿) ￿ q￿] ￿ ￿:
Therefore a cash-card equilibrium exists if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿ = maxfb ￿;￿0g:
Remark 5 In particular, a cash-card equilibrium will exist for ￿ = ￿ and
￿ ￿ minfa(1 ￿ n)[u(q￿) ￿ q￿];[￿ ￿ a(1 ￿ n)]q￿=2g
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Cards increase welfare relative to cash whenever the expected welfare in the card
economy is higher than the expected welfare in the cash economy, i.e., when
a(1 ￿ n)[u(q￿) ￿ q￿] ￿ ￿ ￿ a(1 ￿ n)[u(qm) ￿ qm]
It is clear that at the Friedman rule, cash dominates since qm = q￿. However, u(qm) ￿ qm
also tends to zero as ￿ tends to in￿nity. Hence, there is ~ ￿ > ￿, such that the use of cards
improves upon the use of cash.
7.4 Derivations of NSR and merchant fees
In this section we suppose that there exists a cash-card equilibrium even when ￿ = ￿. The
extension to the other cases is straightforward, but cumbersome. Recall the NSR holds if
￿q￿ ￿ L
Using the lower bound on L from (29), this will hold when
￿ ￿ ￿qm +
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿
[u(qm) ￿ u(q￿) ￿ (qm ￿ q￿)] ￿ ￿q￿
setting ￿ = ￿, this reduces to
￿ ￿ ￿q￿ ￿ ￿q￿ ,
(1 ￿ ￿)q￿ ￿ ￿￿
which is always true.
27Let us now check the upper bound value for K. Again using the lower bound on L we
have
anK = ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ an)L
￿ ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ an)
￿
￿ ￿ ￿qm +
￿a(1 ￿ n)
1 ￿ ￿
[u(qm) ￿ u(q￿) ￿ (qm ￿ q￿)]
￿
,





[u(qm) ￿ u(q￿) ￿ (qm ￿ q￿)]
￿








When they sell for cash, producers get p
(1￿n)















(1 ￿ an)￿q￿ ￿ (2 ￿ an)￿ ￿ a(1 ￿ n)q￿
holds for a close enough to 1 and ￿ > 0, producers paid by card are receive less than those
who are paid by cash (note however that a cash producer must still make a payment to
the CC as an ￿inactive￿agent to remain within the CC). Under the no-default condition,
however, producers are still willing to participate in the CC, and receive payment through
the CC, as they will bene￿t from the CC when they are consumers.
28References
[1] Aiyagari, S. Rao and Stephen D. Williamson, 2000. ￿Money and Dynamic Credit
Arrangements with Private Information,￿ Journal of Economic Theory 91 (2), 248-
79.
[2] Baxter, W.F., 1983. ￿Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal Perspectives,￿
Journal of Law and Economics 26, 541-588.
[3] Berentsen, Aleksander, Gabriele Camera, and Christopher Waller, 2007. ￿Money,
Credit and Banking￿Journal of Economic Theory 135(1), 171-195
[4] Chakravorti, Sujit, 2003. Theory of Credit Card Networks: a Survey of the Literature,
Review of Network Economics 2, 50-68.
[5] Chakravorti, Sujit and Ted To, 1999. ￿A Theory of Credit Cards.￿ Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago Working Paper 1999-16.
[6] Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2006. Statistics on payment and set-
tlement systems in selected countries-Figures for 2004 (Basel, Bank for International
Settlements).
[7] Corbae, Dean and Joseph Ritter, 2004. ￿Decentralized Credit and Monetary Exchange
without Public Record Keeping,￿Economic Theory 24, 933-951.
[8] Evans, David S., and Richard Schmalensee, 2005. ￿The Economics of Interchange Fees
and Their Regulation: an Overview.￿Paper delivered at Interchange Fees in Credit
and Debit Card Industries: What role for Public Authorities?, Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City, May.
[9] Garcia-Swartz, Daniel D., Robert W. Hahn, and Anne Layne-Farrar, 2006. ￿The Move
Toward a Cashless Society: A Closer Look at Payment Instrument Economics,￿Review
of Network Economics 5(2), 175-198.
[10] Gerdes, Geo⁄rey, Jack K. Walton II, May X. Liu, and Darrel W. Parke, 2005. ￿Trends
in the Use of Payment Instruments in the United States,￿Federal Reserve Bulletin 91,
180-201.
29[11] Humphrey, David, Magnus Willesson, Ted Lindblom, and G￿ran Bergendahl, 2003.
￿What Does It Cost to Make a Payment?￿Review of Network Economics 2(2), 159-
174.
[12] Hunt, Robert M., 2003. ￿An Introduction to the Economics of Payment Card Net-
works,￿Review of Network Economics 2, 80-96.
[13] Kahn, Charles M. and William Roberds, forthcoming. ￿Credit and Identity Theft,￿
forthcoming in the Journal of Monetary Economics.
[14] Klee, Elizabeth, 2006. ￿Families￿ Use of Payment Instruments during a Decade of
Change in the U.S. Payment System,￿ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System Finance and Economics Discussion Paper 2006-01.
[15] Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. ￿Money is Memory,￿Journal of Economic Theory
81, 232-251.
[16] Koeppl, Thorsten, Cyril Monnet, and Ted Temzelides, forthcoming. ￿A Dynamic Model
of the Payment System.￿Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper 07-22.
[17] Koeppl, Thorsten, Cyril Monnet, and Ted Temzelides, forthcoming. ￿A Dynamic Model
of Settlement.￿Forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Theory.
[18] Lacker, Je⁄rey M. and Stacey L. Schreft, 1996. ￿Money and Credit as Means of Pay-
ment,￿Journal of Monetary Economics 38, 3-23.
[19] Lagos, Ricardo, and Randall Wright, 2005. ￿A Uni￿ed Framework for Monetary Theory
and Policy Analysis,￿Journal of Political Economy 113(3), 463-484.
[20] Lowe, Philip 2005. ￿Payments System Reform: the Australian Experience,￿Remarks
prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Conference on ￿Interchange
Fees in Credit and Debit Card Industries: What role for Public Authorities?￿Accessed
online at www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/psr/proceedings/2005/lowe.pdf.
[21] Macfarlane, Ian J., 2005. ￿Gresham￿ s Law of Payments,￿Speech at the AIBF Industry
Forum. Accessed online at www.rba.gov.au/ speeches/2005/sp_gov_230305.html.
30[22] Martin, Antoine, Michael Orlando, and David Skeie, forthcoming. ￿Payment Networks
in a Search Model of Money,￿forthcoming in the Review of Economic Dynamics.
[23] Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole, 2002. ￿Some Economics of Payment Card As-
sociations,￿Rand Journal of Economics 33(4), 549-570.
[24] Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole, 2004. ￿Two-sided Markets: an Overview.￿IDEI
working paper, University of Toulouse.
[25] Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole, 2006. ￿Externalities and Regulation in Card
Payment Systems,￿Review of Network Economics 5(1): 1-14.
[26] Rocheteau, Guillaume and Randy Wright, 2005. ￿Money in Search Equilibrium, in
Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium,￿Econometrica 73:
175-202.
[27] Telyukova, Irina A., and Randall Wright, forthcoming. ￿A Model of Money and Credit,
with Application to the Credit Card Puzzle,￿forthcoming in the Review of Economic
Studies.
31